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
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REMARKS:			




NATIONAL DRUG POLICY BOARD

Washington, D.C. 20530

APR 20 1988



FROM:  John C. Lawn, Chairman
Drug Intelligence & Investigations Committees/DEA

STAT

SUBJECT: Commentary on Defense Science Board (DSB) Study
"Detection and Neutralization of Illegal Drugs
and Terrorist Devices"

STAT

TO: See Distribution

Attached for your information is my letter to Mr. Francis A. Keating II as Acting Chairman of the Enforcement Coordinating Group.

Since our individual agencies and departments have all had opportunity to comment on the subject report, I have spared the membership, per se, the necessity of another review. As you will note, I kept my comments general and tried to speak for all of us. My assumptions were that we all would agree that our individual and collective missions can benefit from the selective application of proper technological assistance. We have all noted the overlap between the work of the DSB, the Intelligence R&D Committee, the Interagency Working Group on Drug Enforcement Communications, and the Department of Justice R&D Review Board. Hence, we have need for a permanent National Drug Policy Board structure to coordinate high-technology issues relating to drug supply reduction.

If you wish to correct or add to any of my statements in the attached, or provide Mr. Keating with copies of earlier expressions of agency viewpoints on the DSB report, please do not hesitate to communicate directly with Mr. Keating. I would appreciate copies of all such correspondence for our committees' files.

Attachment

DISTRIBUTION

Honorable Carol T. Crawford, Office of Management & Budget
Honorable George S. Dunlop, Department of Agriculture
Captain Howard S. Gehring, National Narcotics Border Interdiction
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APR 11 1988

Honorable Francis A. Keating, II
Acting Chairman, Enforcement
Coordinating Group
National Drug Policy Board
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Mr. Keating:

I am in receipt of your letter of March 1, 1988 which forwarded a copy of the Defense Science Board (DSB) report on its recent study, "Detection and Neutralization of Illegal Drugs and Terrorist Devices," to be reviewed by the members of the Intelligence and Investigations Committees.

The combined membership of the two committees consists of 22 departments, agencies or staffs; nine of these entities sit on both groups. Not surprisingly, based on their mission imperatives, 11 of the 22 participated in the DSB study. In any case, all 22 have already reviewed and commented on the report in detail, either directly or through their parent departments.

Rather than either create and circulate superfluous copies of this 200-page Secret report or convene special meetings of the two committees to reconsider that which has already been extensively reviewed, I have elected to respond as Chairman, but to confine my remarks to the broader issues raised by the DSB. By copy of this letter, I will advise both committees' membership of the views I express here.

It should perhaps be stated at the outset that the members of the DSB Task Force were outsiders to drug law enforcement and enforcement-related intelligence; they started out with a basic unfamiliarity with the multivaried problems we face, and the restraints imposed on us by law and by our comparative lack of resources. This was rapidly offset; however, by the task force seeking out advisors from enforcement and intelligence; by devising new, analytic approaches to understanding our problems and resultantly, achieving new perspectives.

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The perspectives that were thus brought to bear on the drug problem are firmly grounded in both the physical and behavioral sciences. Additionally, the task force members recognize the need for dual, shared solutions for problems common to both the military and the law enforcement agencies. Finally, the task force is demonstrably skilled at finding new application for extant technology as well as isolating areas for new development.

The report is self-admittedly a starting point, a hypothetical array of key areas where high-technology can be applied; the sum involved in funding these efforts (i.e., \$10 billion to be spent over a five-year span) is illustrative only. It reflects the conclusion by the task force that the problem facing us is of such magnitude that a quantum jump is required for the funding of law enforcement research and development (R&D), as well as acquisition costs and operating expenses. Based on shared needs, such funding would be borne by numerous agencies.

The task force compares its estimations of the scope of the illicit drug market (up to \$200 billion) and societal costs (more than \$100 billion) to the combined Federal drug law enforcement budget: just over \$6 billion. It compares the Department of Defense (DOD) budget for R&D -- \$42 billion -- with the combined enforcement R&D outlays -- one quarter of \$1 billion -- and asks whether we are properly funded for any form of war on drugs.

Technology is developed for the benefit of society, and the dynamic of technological change is a response to varied societal demands. Drug traffickers have their own demands, misuse the dynamic, and can afford to pay the high costs of high technology. Law enforcement is usually in a reactive posture to criminal applications of modern technology and the criminals are unhampered by either fiscal or legal restraints. Traffickers and those engaged in counter-efforts are clearly in an uneven competition.

To improve the situation, the DSB recommends a set of R&D institutions to be established for law enforcement; they deserve particular attention. The first is a permanent R&D committee under the National Drug Policy Board (NDPB). Throughout the DSB report are statements properly deferring to the NDPB role of establishing of priorities for all the research and hardware proposed in the task force report. It would be the NDPB's R&D committee that would exercise that role.

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Of note, in this context, is the report of General Olmstead's Ad Hoc Committee on High Technology to the NDPB Enforcement Coordinating Group on March 16; it recommends, essentially the same approach. Unquestionably, guidance is required for effective and efficient R&D to assist drug law enforcement in rapid and flexible technological deployment; and this strategic guidance must come from the NDPB. Without it, an intolerable persistence of both gaps and overlaps in enforcement technology will occur.

The second major institution recommended by the DSB Task Force is a law enforcement technology analysis center. A model for this is the recent work done by the Institute for Defense Analysis in support of the Federal Aviation Administration. Envisioned is a cadre of experts providing continuity in assessment of enforcement requirements and the commissioning of solutions. Working in tandem with the scientists would be user groups: experienced enforcement personnel, for example, with first-hand knowledge of the actual field conditions in which the specific technologies would be applied.

The third institution is a set of national R&D centers to focus on the array of technological solutions to be shared by DOD and enforcement agencies. Some of these are already extant; night-vision and ground-sensor laboratories are two of many DOD-funded centers whose work is clearly applicable to law enforcement. On the other hand, much of the work done jointly by FBI/DEA in physical and electronic surveillance has military application.


It has become clear in the private sector that successful innovation in R&D only occurs as cross-fertilization from a variety of industrial fields is employed. Corporations no longer run their own company laboratories. Instead, they form larger, multi-technology joint endeavors and take advantage of the economies of scale. Technological development roads are sometimes long, but are no longer separate and parallel; crossover between scientific and engineering disciplines is now encouraged and considered a highly profitable mode of operation.

The same approach in governmental operations can be employed just as successfully. A better integration of R&D is required. The challenge is to develop better methods of applying modern

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technology in support of our limited resources and deploying them more effectively against our criminal adversaries. The DSB Task Force report provides a framework for accepting that challenge.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John C. Lawn". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and a stylized "L".

John C. Lawn, Chairman
Intelligence and Investigations
Committees
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration